

275 file

Memorandum for: THE RECORD

Subject: TALKING POINTS: EXPECTED ALLIED VIEWS
ON ALTERATION/ABANDONMENT OF INTERIM
RESTRAINT

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The attached was prepared [redacted]


[redacted] on 28 May 1985. It was prompted by a request from Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State, and included in a package of intelligence papers distributed to [redacted] principals that same day.

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EUR M 85-10104

E U R A**Office of European Analysis**

State Dept. review completed

TALKING POINTS: EXPECTED ALLIED VIEWS ON ALTERATION/
ABANDONMENT OF INTERIM RESTRAINT

Allied governments endorse the SALT I/II framework and would be critical of US moves to end interim restraints entirely, with perhaps one exception:

- Concerns would be alleviated for the most part if Washington advanced new proposals at Geneva--including initiatives on limiting space defenses--as part of a major new arms control initiative.

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The British Government probably would be the most sensitive to such a US decision:

- The public would ask the government if it agrees with the US decision and whether or not London was consulted by Washington. The government could be put on the defensive and probably forced to take a noncommittal line that the United Kingdom does not interpret treaties between other nations.
- Some British officials already are critical of US allegations that the Soviet construction of a large radar at Krasnoyarsk violates the ABM treaty, fearing Washington intends to use the issue to abrogate the ABM treaty.

The West Germans would view such an announcement as evidence of a significant lack of US interest in arms control:

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- If the announcement were made soon, it would undercut any government plans to respond strongly to recent criticism of US policy by former Chancellor Brandt during his current visit to Moscow.
- Bonn would continue INF deployments but its support would be jeopardized for any additional nuclear modernization programs in Germany.

In the Netherlands, anti-INF forces--including members of the governing coalition--would argue that abandoning interim restraint is a rejection of the SALT framework and demonstrates that the United States is not serious about arms control. Such a US decision would further complicate the government's hopes to make a decision on INF deployment in November.

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Interim restraint policy is not a major issue in Turkey

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A relatively moderate response from the Greek Government is likely following the 2 June parliamentary elections, regardless of the winner. This is in large measure because US and Soviet strategic problems are not a major issue in Greece.

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